Introduction
e persistence of ordinary objects is now a staple topic of contemporary metaphysics. Given the interest and industry that the debate has attracted, it is surprising that (contemporary) philosophers have only recently considered in earnest the impact of relativistic physics on the metaphysics of persistence. As we will see, this omission is now well on course to being recti ed.
We have two aims in this paper. e rst is to provide the reader with a critical guide to this recent work. Much of it investigates whether endurantism can be sustained in the context of relativity. Several arguments have been advanced that aim to show that it cannot. We nd these unpersuasive, and will add our own criticisms to those we review. Our second aim, which complements the rst, is to demarcate the most defensible form of relativistic endurantism (and similarly, of perdurantism). A recurring theme of this paper is that even those philosophers who do worry about relativity have not taken it seriously enough. (Cody Gilmore and, to some extent, Yuri Balashov are exceptions to this general rule.)
Before turning to these two main tasks, we address a worry that we think some will have concerning the legitimacy of the project of articulating a relativistically acceptable version of endurance.
A version of this paper will appear in Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics ( ). Please cite and quote from the published version.
Yuri Balashov deserves most credit for placing the topic of persistence in relativity on the agenda. For earlier discussions, see Quine ( , ) , and Smart ( ).
In most contemporary discussions, the perdurance-endurance debate is rmly rooted in a classical (i.e. non-relativistic) world-view. Philosophers who are wary of metaphysical speculation that fails to take science seriously are likely to take a dim view of much of the contemporary debate. But equally they might judge the project of reconstructing relativistic versions of familiar non-relativistic doctrines to be horribly misguided. Should we not start with the relativistic world picture and ask, in that setting and without reference to non-relativistic notions, how things persist? We have a lot of sympathy for such views, but nonetheless think that it is worthwhile to engage with attempts to square the familiar doctrines with relativity. In the case of perdurantism the project is straightforward (although, as we shall see, the right things have not always been said). As for endurantism, consideration of a relativistic version is worthwhile for at least two reasons.
First, the published arguments recently o ered against relativistic endurantism do not succeed and it is worth putting on record the true reasons why they fail.
Second, and more signi cantly, there is at least a prima facie tension between the perdurantist account of persisting objects and our experience of such objects. Our basic experiential grasp of the persistence of objects involves the direct perception of persistence in single, temporally extended experiences. It is a commonplace in philosophical discussions of perception that we directly perceive motion, e.g., the motion round the dial of the second hand of a watch. But such perceptions are also direct perceptions of persistence; i.e., of the self-same object (the second hand) existing at more than one time.
e tension with perdurance consists in the fact that experience does not present this phenomenon as involving numerically distinct temporal parts of the second hand located at di erent 'times' .
is should be clear when one contrasts the phenomenology of the experience of persistence with the way in which experience presents a spatially extended object, even one that is perceptually homogeneous, as having numerically distinct spatial parts at di erent places. To be spatially extended just is to have numerically distinct parts at distinct locations; or, at least, that is what experience suggests. A further, perhaps more interesting, contrast is with our auditory perception of words. We hear spoken words as temporally extended, and do so in virtue of hearing their numerically distinct constitutive phonemes as located at di erent times. It follows that, despite relativity in some sense clearly favoring perdurance, it is worth asking whether there is not some alternative way of conceptualizing persistence that is compatible with relativity and does better justice to our experience.
Which is not to say that experience presents this phenomenon as not involving numerically distinct temporal parts. is may also be true, but we do not wish to commit ourselves to such a claim here. anks to John Hawthorne for pressing this point.
is need not be a version of endurantism, as that is understood in this paper. See Simons ( ) for a non-perdurantist account of the persistence of ordinary objects that might nonetheless be compatible with an ontology that is perdurantist at a more fundamental level.
In what follows we show how familiar notions of perdurance and endurance should be transformed in the light of relativity, and how relativistic endurantism withstands recent criticisms. Section reviews the standard non-relativistic doctrines and considers what revisions taking relativity seriously requires.
e basic elements of relativistically-defensible endurantism and perdurantism are introduced. Section will also enable us to respond to two recent criticisms of relativistic endurantism, one by Yuri Balashov and the other by Steven Hales and Timothy Johnson. ese we deal with in Sections and respectively.
Section characterizes endurance as involving the multi-location of objects in spacetime. e exact pattern of this multi-location remains to be explored. In Section , we consider Gilmore's discussion of this issue (Gilmore forthcoming) . e most natural of the options Gilmore considers can, we argue, be defended against his objections. Our discussion suggests, however, that an alternative point of view is preferable, one that questions the legitimacy of Gilmore's agenda-setting question. is alternative, moreover, provides a useful perspective from which to reject a nal argument due to Yuri Balashov. We review this argument in Section .
Taking relativity seriously
e persistence debate is but one of three central debates in the philosophy of time. In addition to the opposition between endurantists and perdurantists there is also that between eternalists and non-eternalists and that between tensers and detensers. In contrast to the persistence debate, whether and how relativity impacts upon these other issues is well-trodden ground.
Eternalism is a doctrine concerning the ontological status of times other than the present. Just as we take distant places to be no less real than our immediate spatial locality, so the eternalist holds that all times are ontologically on a par. In contrast, presentists, for example, hold that only the present is real.
Tensers share the presentists' belief that the present is special, but they need not agree that it is ontologically favored. Non-present times might also exist, with the present somehow being metaphysically special, perhaps because there are tensed facts. Facts about which events are occurring (present tensed), for example, would pick out as privileged the time at which those events (tenselessly) occur. Tensers take (token) tensed utterances to be made true by such tensed facts. In contrast, the detenser rejects the idea that the present is metaphysically special. All times are on a par, period. And just as token utterances involving indexicals such as "here" and "I" are standardly held to be made true by non-indexical facts, so the detenser asserts that token utterances of tensed sentences are made true by tenseless facts.
For this reason, detenserism is also known as indexicalism (cf. Merricks , ) .
For some detensers, an utterance at time t of "It is now raining", for example, is (tenselessly) true i it is (tenselessly) raining at time t. For others, an utterance of "It is now raining" is (tenselessly) true i it is (tenselessly) raining simultaneous with that utterance. We take it that relativity rules decisively against both the non-eternalist and the tenser. To quote the title of Savitt ( ), "there's no time like the present (in Minkowski spacetime). " Both presentism and tensed theories of time need an objectively privileged set of subregions of spacetime, each of which can serve as the present as 'time passes' (however this is to be interpreted!). Relativistic physics simply does not provide such a set. Faced with this fact, the tenser can choose to regard the relativistic picture of the world as simply incomplete: there are, in addition to the spatiotemporal facts describable in properly relativistic language, facts about what is present. Such a view is clearly logically consistent, but it prompts an immediate question: are these facts observable? If they are, then relativistic physics is empirically inadequate. Some philosophers no doubt believe this. ey are likely to see the experiential phenomena associated with the idea that time passes as lying outside the scope of relativity. But we believe that there is no good reason to think that these phenomena cannot be completely explained in (relativistic) tenseless terms. And we take an eternalist tenseless theory of time to be vindicated if the tenser's additional metaphysical facts are unobservable to the extent that even the nature of our temporal experience fails to constitute evidence for them.
What of endurance? e combination of eternalism and a tenseless theory of time falls short, by itself, of ruling this out. Endurance involves persisting objects being wholly present at di erent times. For tenseless eternalists, therefore, endurance involves persisting objects existing at multiple times by being tenselessly and wholly located at these times. But note that the kernel of tenseless eternalism is that all times are on a par. Since the endurantist is not committed to regarding any time-any particular temporal location of any particular enduring object-as special, endurantism and tenseless eternalism are entirely consistent. Of course anyone who embraces this position must respond to Lewis' ( , -) problem of temporary intrinsics. e endurantist does so by relativizing property instantiation to times.
One moral of relativity is that there is no privileged present, but since the endurantist need not regard any time as privileged, why need more be said? e answer lies with the reason why a relativistic world does not admit a privileged e issue is (surprisingly) controversial though. What follows is not intended to persuade committed non-eternalist tensers. We are merely clarifying our position, which we take to be that of Saunders ( ). See e.g. Prior ( , ). We will not rehearse the various di erent ways to implement this relativization. An overview is found in Haslanger ( ).
present. A er all, nothing in Newtonian physics singles out (now!) a particular time as 'the Now' , but the tenser will not judge Newtonian physics to be inadequate for that reason. e reason why there is no time like the present in Minkowski spacetime is that, in Minkowski spacetime, there is no time. is, we think, is the lesson of relativity that many philosophers have yet to take fully on board. It means, clearly, that our characterization of endurance in terms of time-relativized property instantiation by objects multiply located at di erent times must be revised. But so must the characterizations of eternalism and the tenseless theory of time, for these too were stated in terms of times. Without modi cation, relativity is as inimical to these positions as it is to their rivals.
. Formulating Relativistic Perdurance
e required alteration to eternalism is obvious and trivial. Relativistic eternalism is simply the doctrine that all regions of spacetime are on a par, ontologically and metaphysically. It is with many philosophers' attempts to formulate relativistic versions of the other positions that we disagree. e most popular strategy, surely, has been to frame-relativize. is, we contend, is fundamentally wrong-headed. A few examples will illustrate our point.
Consider Ted Sider's de nition of a temporal part, and his associated de nition of four-dimensionalism (perdurantism):
x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t = df ( ) x exists at, but only at, t; and ( ) x is a part of y at t; and ( ) x overlaps at t everything that is a part of y at t.
. . . Four-dimensionalism may then be formulated as the claim that, necessarily, each spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists. is all could be made relativistically acceptable by relativizing the de nition of a temporal part to a frame of reference, and then stating four-dimensionalism as the claim that for any chosen frame of reference, every spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment of time at which it exists. (Sider , ) Note that there are two temporally relativized notions at play here: parthood-ata-time and existence-at-a-time. Sider himself prefers an atemporal notion of parthood, and o ers alternative de nitions in terms of it ( , -). He chooses to o er de nitions in terms of the temporally relativized notion purely because he thinks that this may be the only notion acceptable to his endurantist opponent; he is concerned to state four-dimensionalism in a manner that his opponent must admit is intelligible. Even if we avoid temporally relativized parthood, however, temporally relativized existence remains, and is crucial to the de nitions framed in terms of atemporal parthood.
e 'times' of the de nitions simply do not exist in a relativistic world. But what is wrong with Sider's response: replace them with the times of inertial frames? A number of things.
First, an ambiguity in the frame-relativized de nition needs to be clari ed. Is it taken to be a frame-relative matter what temporal parts the object has? (Relative to frame F the object has one set of temporal parts each existing at, and only at, a time in F; relative to frame F ′ it has another set, and so on.) Or is the idea that the object has all of these temporal parts quite independently of whether we consider things from the point of view of some particular frame of reference?
It is perhaps obvious that the second of these proposals was intended, but it is nonetheless worth stating explicitly what is wrong with the rst. It seeks to attach a metaphysical weight to frames of reference that they simply do not carry. Inertial frames of reference (or, more accurately, spacetime coordinate systems adapted to them) are no more than the spatiotemporal analogues of Cartesian coordinate systems. e atness of the spacetime of special relativity means that certain spacetime coordinate systems have a privileged status with respect to the spatiotemporal distance relations holding between spacetime points. e coordinate di erences of such points with respect to these special coordinate systems encode, in a direct manner, the spatiotemporal distances, just as the coordinate di erences in Cartesian coordinates encode Euclidean distances. But just as no one would attach ontological weight to features of an object that are relative to a choice of Cartesian coordinates, so no one should attach signi cance to properties of objects that are essentially de ned in terms of canonical frames of reference.
From the physicist's perspective, the content of spacetime is as it is. One can choose to describe this content from the perspective of a particular inertial frame of reference (i.e., to describe it relative to some standard of rest and some standard Sider's treatment is arguably more sophisticated than our chosen quotation suggests. In Section , we will partly endorse his critique of an anti-endurantist argument by Yuri Balashov. Nonetheless, there remain vestiges of frame-relativization even in that critique.
Perhaps there is a third option: it is a frame-independent matter that the object has all such parts, but it is a frame-dependent matter which proper subset of these parts counts as the set of its temporal parts. We nd it hard to see what work the honori c "temporal" does on such a view.
For two spacetime points with coordinates (x, y, z, t) and (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ , t ′ ), the distance between them is given by (x − x ′ ) + (y − y ′ ) + (z − z ′ ) − (t − t ′ ) just as, in Euclidean space, the distance between two points with coordinates (x, y, z) and
the points are spacelike related (i.e., they are some spatial distance apart). If (x − x ′ ) + (y − y ′ ) + (z − z ′ ) − (t − t ′ ) < the points are timelike related (i.e., they are some temporal distance apart). If
= the points (assuming they are distinct) are lightlike related.
of distant simultaneity that are optimally adapted to the geometry of spacetime but are otherwise arbitrary). But one can equally choose to describe the contents of spacetime with respect to some frame that is not so optimally adapted to the geometric structure of spacetime, or indeed, choose to describe it in some entirely frame-independent manner. Second, Sider's frame-relativized de nition tells us that the perduring object has 'temporal' parts located at certain regions of spacetime (subregions of the 'times' of inertial frames) within the object's worldtube. What of the other subregions of its worldtube? Does it have parts located at these? We do not doubt that Sider answers a rmatively. is may even follow from the principle of unrestricted mereological composition, to which Sider signs up. But this would be to miss the point that, from a relativistic point of view, the assumption that a perduring object has parts at every proper subregion of its worldtube is overwhelmingly natural. Call this the doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts. From a relativistic point of view, it should be a starting point, not something that falls out from a frame-relative generalization of the non-relativistic notion of a temporal part together with unrestricted composition. Indeed, from the relativistic perspective, the existence of speci cally 'temporal' parts of an object does not even warrant comment.
is last claim might seem too strong, for, in the non-relativistic context, a perduring object's temporal parts perform a vital function. Consider the spatial analogy. It is not incidental to an object's spatial extension that it has parts located in subregions of the region it occupies. One wants to say that it is spatially extended in virtue of these parts. Likewise, one might say that an object's having some particular spatial shape simply consists in its having parts arranged in a particular spatial con guration. In a similar way, the non-relativistic perdurantist will say that an object persists (i.e., extends through time) in virtue of having distinct temporal parts located at each time. Do temporal parts play an analogous role in the context of relativity? Do they explain how persisting objects succeed in being extended in, say, timelike directions?
Before answering, we should clarify what might be meant by a relativistic (in- Sattig ( , ) . It faces the following problem. Objects can be 'gappy' if (e.g.) they are composed of nitely many pointlike parts standing in nite spatiotemporal distance relations. What should we take as the worldtube of such an object? If one took the view that the object's exact location in spacetime was simply the fusion of the exact, pointlike locations of each of its parts, then the doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts falls out, but threatens to become a triviality (we ignore for the time being the possibility of extended simples). But such a de nition of a composite object's worldtube is, in certain respects, unnatural. Consider the purely spatial case, and an object composed of interacting pointlike parts whose short-range repulsive forces prevent other objects from entering a continuous spatial region that contains all the parts of the object. (For example: consider a table!) Don't we want to say that such an object occupies a continuous spatial region? If a more inclusive de nition of an object's worldtube is adopted, then more work is required to articulate the relativistic intuition that lies behind the doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts. stantaneous) 'temporal' part. We have already reviewed Sider's de nition: a temporal part of an object exists at, and only at, a time in some inertial frame, and overlaps everything that is part of O that exists at that time. omas Sattig has recently o ered a rather di erent de nition that we nonetheless take to be equivalent:
(TP:R SR ) A spacetime point or region R is a temporal part of a spacetime region R ′ relative to a frame of reference f = df R is a maximal sum of parts of R ′ that are simultaneous relative to f .
(TP:O SR ) An object x is a temporal part of an object y relative to a frame of reference f = df (i) x is part of y, (ii) y [exactly] occupies a spacetime region R, (iii) x occupies a point or region that is a temporal part of R relative to f , and (iv) x does not occupy any other region. (Sattig , ) Here is how the basic entities that these de nitions pick out can be characterized in a more relativistically acceptable manner. First, let us say that a perduring object's path is the spacetime region that it exactly occupies. e characterization is then that:
actly occupies a region R P that is spacelike, (iii) R P is a maximal spacelike subregion of the path R O of O and (iv) R P is at.
e vital question is now whether the perdurantist should adopt TP. Clause (i) needs no justi cation. (ii) captures the idea that the part is 'instantaneous'; i.e., that it has no temporal extent. (iii) corresponds to Sider's requirement that a temporal part of O at t overlap every part of O that exists at t. We are happy to be stipulative here. (iv), on the other hand, is quite without motivation. It is a relic of the frame-relative perspective. While at regions of spacetime are in some sense geometrically privileged, there is no reason to suppose that this gives them any special metaphysical status, in the context of questions about persistence or otherwise. More signi cantly, one surely wants a de nition applicable in the context of our best theory of space and time, general relativity. While this theory allows spacetimes containing at spacelike regions, generic matter-lled worldtubes will have no at maximal spacelike subregions. e obvious emendation, therefore, is simply to drop clause (iv). is gives our preferred de nition of an instantaneous temporal part.
We will soon replace this de nition with Gilmore's more general, and hence more useful, notion (Gilmore forthcoming, § ) . e general style of de nition that we see as suitable for the relativistic context is very similar to the style adopted by Gilmore. As we said above (p. ), our general criticism that philosophers do not take relativity seriously enough should not be taken to apply to Gilmore.
A region R is spacelike just if every pair of distinct points in R are spacelike separated. is is just Gilmore's notion of achronal (Gilmore forthcoming, § ). Now it is certainly true that temporally extended objects are temporally extended in virtue of being composed of temporal parts. But our earlier claim still stands: from the relativistic point of view, temporal parts are hardly worth de ning. Consider a spatial analogy. I position my desk so that one edge runs exactly North-South. Is it true that my desk extends in the North-South direction in virtue of being composed of a set of two-dimensional parts running East-West? Yes. But it is equally true that it extends in the North-South direction in virtue of being composed of a set of two-dimensional parts running North-South. Its being composed of the set of pointlike parts standing in the con guration they in fact stand in explains its being extended in a North-South direction just as well too. It should be clear that relativity's uni cation of space and time leaves no distinctive work for the notion of a temporal part to do in explaining persistence.
. Formulating Relativistic Endurance
Much of our discussion of relativistic perdurance is applicable to the analogous topic of relativistic endurance. To this topic we now turn.
In the non-relativistic context, enduring objects are meant to be entities that are ( ) only spatially extended (if extended at all) and ( ) wholly present at each moment at which they exist. Since we are supposing that they are, tenselessly, at each of these times, they are ( ) multiply located. Since enduring objects change, they cannot in general possess properties simpliciter but rather ( ) instantiate a property only relative to a time.
It should be clear from our discussion of perdurance that the wrong way to relativistically re-construe all this is to replace reference to moments and times with reference to the times of inertial frames. One should not say, for example, that relative to each inertial frame, an enduring object is wholly present at multiple times in that inertial frame.
We recommend that the would-be endurantist adopt the following position in the context of relativity. Corresponding to the non-relativistic properties ( ) and ( ), the endurantist should say that persisting objects are multiply located in space-
We have already mentioned that Sider's discussion of relativistic endurance places undue emphasis on times-in-frames (see fn ). Rea proposes that the endurantist restrict composition to "times in frames of reference" (Rea , ) . Sattig proposes that relativistic endurantism be formulated as the claim that: "(i) an ordinary object occupies multiple spacetime regions, and (ii) these regions are temporally unextended, or instantaneous, relative to some inertial frame of reference, and lie on di erent frame-relative hyperplanes" (Sattig , ) . It should be clear why we object to at least the formulation of all these proposals.
Despite the reservations expressed in the last footnote, Sattig's view is close to the one we recommend in that it involves entities that are not temporally extended exactly occupying multiple regions of spacetime. It is again Gilmore who has articulated the most satisfactory relativistic version of endurance (cf. Gilmore forthcoming, § ). time: they are (tenselessly) wholly present in multiple regions of spacetime. Corresponding to property ( ), the endurantist should hold that these regions are not temporally extended, i.e., they are spacelike: any two distinct points in such a region should be spacelike related. Corresponding to property ( ), the endurantist should hold that persisting objects do not (in general) instantiate properties simpliciter, but rather only relative to particular spacetime regions, viz. their locations (or suitable regions that contain their locations). All of this leaves open the question of which spacelike regions an enduring object occupies. We postpone proper discussion of this question until Section .
A few comments on the idea that objects can be multiply located are in order. Some nd the very idea paradoxical. We will not try to convince everyone that the notion makes sense, but we are concerned to carry with us those who have no problem with the idea of endurance in a (tenseless eternalist) non-relativistic context. To this end it is useful to distinguish two conceptions of the spacetime of Newtonian physics. According to one way of thinking Newtonian spacetime is at some level of abstraction no di erent from relativistic spacetime. One has a four-dimensional manifold of spacetime points that stand in the very same kind of spatial and temporal distance relations. e only di erence concerns the patterns in which these various relations are instantiated. In the Newtonian case, every pair of spacetime points stand in some temporal distance relation, and all and only those between which there is zero temporal separation stand, additionally, in some spatial distance relation. In the relativistic case, spatial (i.e. spacelike), temporal (i.e. timelike) and null distances are mutually exclusive. Every pair of points stand in one of these relations, but if they stand in one of them, they do not stand in either of the others. Anyone who assimilates the spacetimes of Newtonian physics and relativity to this extent surely will not have trouble with the notion of multi-location in the latter but not the former.
We suspect, therefore, that those who think they can make sense of endurance in a Newtonian context, but think they cannot do so in a relativistic context, conceive of Newtonian spacetime in a very di erent way. When it comes to Newtonian spacetime they believe (ex hypothesi) in the equal reality of all parts of the fourdimensional manifold of possible event locations, but they do not see this manifold as a fundamentally unitary entity, the partitioning of which into times (surfaces of simultaneity) is merely a function of the temporal distance relations between its ere is more to be said about this notion of being (exactly) located at a particular region of spacetime or, correlatively, of exactly occupying such a region. Although we will touch on some of the issues, we refer the reader to Sattig's discussion ( , ) and, especially, to Gilmore's in this volume (forthcoming, § ).
Barker and Dowe ( , ) provide an interesting argument to this e ect. Our preferred response is that of Gilmore (forthcoming, § ): an object can exactly occupy a set of regions without exactly occupying the fusion of those regions.
parts. Rather, they will take times as fundamental and see the four-dimensional manifold one obtains from their union as the thing that has a secondary status. For such an endurantist, existing at more than one time might seem importantly di erent from being located in more than one place in a single space. And exemplifying a property in a time-relative manner may not simply be a matter of exemplifying a property relative to the (temporal) location one is at.
Our challenge to such endurantists is to articulate what goes on when an enduring object time-travels so as to coexist with its younger self. It would be a problem for the endurantist if he could not accommodate the conceptual possibility of time travel (cf. Sider , -). e most natural, and we think correct, endurantist description of the envisaged scenario is that the enduring object not only exists at many di erent times but also exists at (is located at) more than one place at the same time. It is no more problematic to think of property instantiation as relativized to spatial locations as to temporal locations: in one place, the time traveler is standing (and dark haired); in another he is sitting (and grey haired). But this type of spatial multi-location, and location-relative property instantiation is all the endurantist needs in order to understand multi-location in relativistic spacetime.
. Formulating Relativistic Truth Conditions
So far we have sought to articulate the versions of various views familiar from nonrelativistic debates (eternalism, endurantism and perdurantism) that are natural from the relativistic point of view. Our task is almost done, but there is one position that we have not yet examined, namely the tenseless theory of time and its indexical treatment of tensed utterances. Recall that, according to this view, tensed utterances (located as they are at certain times) are held to be true just if the appropriate things are going on at those times (or, for utterances in tenses other than the present, at times bearing the right temporal relations to the time of utterance). Since there are no times in relativity, some revision is in order here too.
In spite of our earlier complaints, with regard to tensed utterances frame-relativization might seem legitimate. Familiarity with relativity should not prevent us from acknowledging a natural propensity to believe in (absolute) simultaneity. e detenser sees our present tense utterances as an attempt to talk of those events we believe to be occurring at that time. Given relativity, such a belief is arguably just false. But a more charitable interpretation regards it as merely incomplete, this being remedied by supplying a frame to accompany our talk of that which is 'simultaneous' . e most obvious way to do this is to idealize and use the frame in Here we disagree with Sider ( , -) . Our time traveler is located at P and is standing there at t, and also located at P ′ and is sitting there at t. At t he is both sitting and standing. ere is no contradiction, for he does these things in di erent places. But he is not (then) both sitting and standing at P ′ ; at this location, he is only sitting.
which the speaker is (instantaneously) at rest at the spacetime 'point' at which the utterance is made. One then applies the standard non-relativistic account of the tenseless truth conditions of tensed utterances to this utterance with respect to this frame. is way of interpreting tensed utterances will have some counterintuitive consequences. Suppose (improbably) that two people are discussing the goings on in some far distant solar system in their mutual topological present. Given the distances involved, these two speakers need only be moving with respect to each other with a small relative velocity for one and same event to count as having occurred many years ago for one speaker but to be an event that will occur many years in the future for the other. But given the speed of light (and given the time it takes to have a thought or make an utterance), such anomalies only show up when astronomical distances are involved. For all practical purposes, when our talk is con ned to discussing processes and events that occur over even the smallest timescales that we can perceptually discriminate, at locations no more spatially distant from us than, say, the diameter of the Earth, with respect to any shared region of spacetime all speakers will agree concerning which tensed sentences are true, no matter what (within practical limits) their relative velocities.
While the frame-relativized proposal for interpreting tensed utterances will get the truth values of realistic tensed utterances right, we wish to suggest an alternative, which we think has some rather attractive consequences.
Tensed utterances describe the world from a particular spatiotemporal view. Our spatiotemporal view of the world privileges a spatially extended present. Why? We think a plausible answer starts with the suggestion that we take the present to be the location of the objects with which we can interact. e past can only causally a ect us; we cannot, as of the here and now, a ect it. e future can only be a ected by us; it cannot a ect us in the here and now. But objects and events in the present both act on us and can be acted on by us (and by acting on us through our senses, they do so in a much more immediate and vivid manner than objects in the past).
Setting things up in this way leads to an obvious question: in the context of relativity, what is the extent of the domain of those objects which, at some moment in our lives, both can act upon us and be acted upon by us? Here by 'moment' e topological present, or absolute elsewhere of a spacetime point p is the set of points that are spacelike related to it. From the perspective of any point, relativistic spacetime can be considered to be divided into three exclusive regions: the absolute future of that point (the set of all points that can be connected to p by a future-directed timelike or lightlike curve starting at p), its absolute past (the set of all points that can be connected to p by a past-directed timelike or lightlike curve starting at p), and its absolute elsewhere.
e following takes its inspiration from Butter eld ( ) and Stein ( , -) though it hardly does justice to these subtle papers. We strongly recommend the latter to any philosopher tempted to engage in frame-relativization of their favorite concepts in the face of relativity.
we mean a temporally extended but short-lived (i.e. momentary) interval, and the answer will depend on its temporal extent. Let us rst take it to be the duration of the specious present, the time it takes to have a single thought or enjoy a single experience.
is, let us say, is about . of a second. Call the temporally extended spacetime region you occupy (partially or multiply) during this 'moment' NOW. To be something that can a ect you in the NOW, an object must be located within the backward lightcone of the future boundary of NOW. To be something that can be a ected by you, as located in the NOW, the object must fall within the future light cone of the past boundary of NOW. Call the region bounded by these two lightcones the Stein Present of the NOW. e NOW's Stein Present is a four-dimensional discus-shaped region centered on the NOW. e immediate thing to note about it is that it is, spatially speaking, very wide (of the order of , kilometers), even though it is, temporally speaking, very thin (no wider that . seconds, where it overlaps the NOW).
e source of the presentist's (false) intuition might then be as follows. ey are inclined to accord a kind of ontological privilege to that with which they can (then) interact. What they can interact with, at a particular near-momentary subregion R of their worldtube, is the contents of that region's Stein Present. But we noted above that such a Stein Present has very little temporal thickness and is very large in spatial extent. Such a region is easily mistaken for an instantaneous, global present.
We propose to link tensed talk to Stein Presents as follows. Our tensed talk, which reports our spatiotemporal perspective on the world as at R, should be partially analyzed in term of R's Stein Present. e present tense is correctly used at R to talk about objects and events as they are in the Stein Present of R, the past tense is correctly used to talk about objects and events as they are in the absolute past of R, and the future tense is correctly used to talk about objects and events as they are in the absolute future of R.
ese categories are not exhaustive. ere are regions of the absolute elsewhere of R that fall outside its Stein Present. But this is just as it should be. It is intuitively right that, if the temporal extent of the now is of the order of a specious present, then one cannot correctly use the present tense to talk about some event in one's absolute elsewhere that is, say, four light years away. It also means that, during the eleventh Apollo mission, no one in mission control in Houston could sensibly ask "What is Armstrong doing now?" while he was on the Moon. But rather than being a problem for the proposal, this just highlights that the duration of 'now' is (normally) longer than the specious present and is, quite generally, context sensitive.
A er Stein ( , -) , who singles out the same region for somewhat di erent reasons. Consider how extended the 'now' must be for the following exchange to be appropriate. Longtime family friend: "What are Alice and Bob up to now?" Alice's mother: " ey're trying for a baby. "
Coexistence, relativity and endurance
We have already provided inter alia an initial sketch of our preferred version of relativistic endurance (see Section . ). It is now time to consider the recent spate of anti-endurantist arguments that appeal to relativity. Our primary purpose is to demonstrate that they all fail, but discussion of the arguments will also provide us with an opportunity to articulate further what relativistic endurance must involve.
We start with an argument, due to Yuri Balashov, that appeals to a notion of non-trivial coexistence (Balashov a,c) . Our discussion is indebted to Gilmore ( ), who we think has already given the decisive rebuttal. Balashov has since replied to Gilmore (Balashov ) , marshalling against endurantism further arguments based on coexistence and relativity that he rst employed against stage theory (Balashov ) . We will see that these arguments are no more e ective. Balashov assumes eternalism, but suggests that both endurantists and perdurantists should acknowledge a non-trivial sense of 'coexist' such that the set of things with which an object coexists (as located at some spacetime region R) is neither empty (except for the object itself) nor simply the set of things located somewhere in spacetime ( a, ; , -). e following claims, which we take to be true when appropriately understood, illustrate the idea. We both (now) coexist with Yuri Balashov, and have done since birth. We both used to coexist with Quine, but do so no longer. At no point in our lives has either of us coexisted with Napoleon.
Balashov's original argument, as Gilmore nicely sets out, involves three principal claims (Gilmore , -) . ( ) In the relativistic context, the non-trivial coexistence of two objects should be taken (by both perdurantists and endurantists) to be grounded in the (at least partially) spacelike separation of the two spacetime regions that the objects occupy. (Gilmore calls this CASS: Coexistence As Spacelike Separation.) ( ) e endurantist, but not the perdurantist, must understand non-trivial coexistence in a 'tensed' or 'temporally loaded' manner. (Gilmore calls this the Asymmetry esis.) ( ) A temporally loaded notion of coexistence (but only a temporally loaded notion) based on spacelike separation leads to absurdity.
Where possible we will speak of objects' locations intending to cover both the (exact but nonunique) locations of enduring objects and the (partial) locations of perduring objects. Note that the qualifying relativization of coexistence to a spacetime region is as appropriate for (the temporal parts of) perduring objects as for enduring objects. O en property instantiation by temporal parts of perduring objects is property instantiation simpliciter whereas, for enduring objects, it must (almost) always be relativized to a spacetime region (a possible exception being any constant properties such as the charge of elementary particles). But which objects a temporal part of a perduring object coexists with in a non-trivial sense is just as much a function of its spacetime location as it is for enduring objects. Since the temporal part of the perduring object has but one location, the location relativization can be dropped without ambiguity; the same is obviously not true in the case of enduring objects.
(Gilmore calls this the Absurdity esis.) We will consider these claims in order, agreeing with Gilmore that ( ) and ( ) are false. As regards ( ), we will concede some ground, but not enough to make Balashov's argument go through.
. e Coexistence Relation
Balashov settles on spacelike separation as the appropriate relativistic relation to ground non-trivial coexistence because he sees it as the best candidate that is (i) objective, (ii) symmetric and (iii) relevant. We shall see in a moment that Gilmore rejects (i), favoring instead of CASS a frame-relative coexistence relation. We noted in Section . that giving frame-relativized truth conditions for tensed utterances is not obviously misguided. is fact can be used to motivate Gilmore's proposal, for surely the obvious non-trivial notion of coexistence is just the (present) tensed notion, and is thus intimately related to our earlier discussion of tense. We explore this connection below. In fact, the frame-relativized truth conditions proposal can also be used to motivate an alternative candidate coexistence relation that meets the objectivity requirement. Unfortunately, as we shall see, this second proposal has other unwelcome features. Our proposal to interpret tensed utterances in terms of Stein Presents suggests a third option. We review its strengths before contrasting the proposal with Balashov's CASS. Our problem with CASS is that it does not, a er all, meet the relevance requirement. We do not question the last two of Balashov's three putative desiderata. We take it as analytic that coexistence is symmetric. (Our preferred parsing of the relation is: x coexists with y i x exists for y and y exists for x. So conceived, it is clearly symmetric, although exists for may not be.) e criterion of relevance is also not disputable. If the coexistence of x and y is to be understood as grounded in some further relation holding between them (or their locations), it had better be clear why this relation's holding means that x and y coexist. But what of objectivity?
Gilmore's preferred alternative to CASS is a frame-relativized notion of coexistence: x (as at p) and y (as at q) coexist relative to frame F i their locations (p and q) are simultaneous-in-F (Gilmore , ) . ere is an obvious connection between Gilmore's suggestion and the frame-relativized truth conditions proposal of Section . . Suppose one adopts our proposal that x coexists with y i x exists for y and y exists for x.
en any speaker S, as located at r, can truly say that x and y coexist (present tense) just if, for S as at r, x exists (present tense) for y and vice versa. In other words, any speaker S can truly say at r that x and y coexist (present tense) just if there are locations p and q of x and y that are simultaneous with r in the instantaneous rest frame of S at r. But that is just to say that x and y, See Balashov ( a, -; c, S ) for a discussion of the merits of CASS. See Balashov ( a, ) for the three desiderata.
as at these locations, coexist relative to S's rest frame in Gilmore's sense. (Similarly, S can truly say at r that the two objects coexisted if they have locations that are simultaneous with respect to S's instantaneous rest frame at r but which lie on a plane of simultaneity to the past of r, relative to this frame.) As Gilmore concedes, the proposal violates (i), where this is understood as requiring that there be an absolute fact of the matter (and not merely a variety of frame-relative facts) about whether two objects coexist (Balashov c, S ). However, the machinery of frame-relative truth conditions can be used to construct a coexistence relation that satis es (i) a er all. In the analysis of the preceding paragraph what counted was whether x exists for y and y exists for x from some third-person perspective. Di erent perspectives, and thus di erent frames, yield di erent answers to the question of whether x and y coexist. But perhaps we can satisfy (i) by nding an objectively preferred frame (or even pair of frames) to give an objectively preferred answer. One obvious suggestion is to ask whether x exists for y from y's (tensed) perspective and whether y exists for x from x's (tensed) perspective.
Combining this idea with the frame-relative truth conditions for tensed utterances, however, yields a notion that Balashov considers and rightly rejects (Balashov a, -) . Here is the problem with it. x, as at p, coexists with y, as at q, i x exists for y at q and y exists for x at p. But to exist for x as at p (in the present-tensed, frame-relativized sense), y need only be located at some point that is simultaneous with p in x's rest frame (as at p). is need not be q, which in general will not be simultaneous with p (in x's instantaneous rest frame at p). Similarly, for x to be real for y as at q, x need only be located at some point that is simultaneous with q in y's rest-frame (as at q). Again, this need not be p. But surely the coexistence of x as at p with y as at q, if this is to be a matter of the spatiotemporal relations holding between their locations, should just be a matter of the spatiotemporal relation between p and q, not a matter of how four of their locations are interrelated.
at frame-relativized truth conditions yield such an unsatisfactory notion of non-trivial coexistence could actually be taken as a reason to reject the framerelativized truth conditions proposal. How do our alternative truth conditions in term of Stein Presents fair? We think that Stein Presents may be rather well suited to grounding the kind of non-trivial coexistence relation required.
e idea that there is a link between non-trivial coexistence and tensed attributions of existence suggests the following. Consider two persisting objects x and y located at p and q respectively. We are supposing that p and q are pointlike (or, if the idealization that x and y have no spatial extent is dropped, that p and q have Balashov thinks that coexistence so construed would involve "representation in absentia" (Balashov a, ), but since each of the four locations involved has the relevant enduring object tenselessly located at it, we have trouble understanding what Balashov means by 'in absentia' here. no temporal thickness). Even so, there may be associated with x, as at p, a contextually determined, temporally extended now (NOW p ), centered on p. Where x is something that has experiences, the extent of such a NOW will never be less than x's specious present. If x is capable of relatively sophisticated re ection on its spatiotemporal environment, then, as seen above (p. ), context may determine that the NOWs associated with some points of its worldline have a temporal extent greater than this. A non-sentient persister has no specious present; does this mean that for each point p of its worldline the only relevant Stein Present is simply p itself? At one level this seems correct: there is no non-trivial notion of coexistence applicable to such objects because, having no perspective at all, they have no spatiotemporal perspective on the world. ere can be no question of which objects exist for them as at p. On the other hand, it seems that someone might legitimately talk of the (non-trivial) coexistence of non-sentient objects, in which case, we suggest, the contextually determined duration of the speaker's NOW, at the time of any such attribution, is used to determine extended NOWs for the objects under consideration.
With temporally extended NOWs for x and y (associated with points p and q) in hand, we can make the following proposal: x and y coexist just if p falls within the Stein Present of NOW q and q falls within the Stein Present of NOW p . e proposal gives our illustrative coexistence claims the right truth values. But more than this, coexistence turns out to be very close to what one might, pre-theoretically, have taken it to be. If x and y coexist (as at p and q respectively), then x is in the present of y and vice versa. eir presents (at p and q) substantially overlap and so, as at these regions, there is a reasonable sense in which they share a common present. And, reassuringly, since communication is a speci c form of interaction, we will always coexist in the non-trivial sense with those with whom we are (then) communicating.
As de ned, coexistence is symmetric. But the more basic notion in terms of which it is de ned-x exists for y at q i x is located somewhere within y's Stein Present at q-is not. In most cases the relation will hold in both directions (as one would hope), but it need not do so. And this, we think, is as it should be. Elephants, and indeed humans, have a much slower metabolism than gnats. is means that a gnat's Stein Presents (assuming these are taken to be determined by the duration of the gnat's specious present) are much less spatially extended than ours. But this seems intuitively right. e spatial horizons of the world of the gnat are more limited than ours. Now consider two inhabitants of spacetime with wildly di erent metabolic rates (an extreme case of the elephant and gnat). ey could be located in regions R and R ′ respectively such that the inhabitant with the shorter specious present, located at R ′ , exists for the inhabitant with the more extended specious present, located at R, but not vice versa. is again seems to us to be the right result.
Clearly work needs to be done to esh out these tentative suggestions, but our conviction is that the machinery of Stein Presents promises to provide an intuitively satisfying notion of coexistence that obviously meets the relevance requirement. Contrast this with Balashov's CASS (or with his replacement CASH (Balashov , ) , according to which a collection of n objects coexist as at their n respective locations i these locations all lie on a at spacelike hypersurface).
is allows that objects can coexist no matter how distant, and thus no matter how causally disconnected. As our earlier discussion of Stein Presents should suggest, we think this gets things exactly the wrong way round. Once one learns to take relativity seriously, it should be obvious that, to controvert Balashov's example, Gamow and the Andromeda Nebula do not coexist in anything but the eternalist's universalist sense.
. e Asymmetry esis
We now turn to the second of Balashov's three central claims. e Asymmetry esis is the assertion that only endurantists are committed to a 'temporally loaded' understanding of coexistence (Balashov a, -; c, S -; , -). In seeking to understand this claim one needs to keep two things in mind. First, Balashov assumes that the relativistic endurantist will be an eternalist detenser, so, although Balashov's language in places suggests otherwise, 'temporally loaded' is not meant to indicate that the eternalist is committed to, e.g., a tensed view of time. Second, both the perdurantist and endurantist should admit the propriety of tensed talk, where this is understood as (no more than) a way of describing the world in a perspective-dependent way from a particular spatiotemporal point of view.
So what does Balashov mean by 'temporally loaded'? Balashov is explicit that the di erence between enduring and perduring objects that grounds the legitimacy of applying 'temporally loaded' determinations to the former but not the latter, is
In terms of the desiderata of this section, we therefore think that CASS in fact violates (iii). Balashov defends this aspect of his proposal by suggesting that even in the non-relativistic case, where existing at the same time is (allegedly) uncontroversially the relation that grounds nontrivial coexistence, causally unconnected items coexist (Balashov , ) . It should be clear from our previous discussion of Stein Presents why we are as suspicious of this idea in the non-relativistic context as we are in the relativistic one.
Again, Balashov's language at times suggests that the perdurantist cannot admit the legitimacy of tensed talk. In fact, Balashov is only keen to stress that perduring objects are singly located in spacetime and, as such, can only have one spatiotemporal perspective on the world. He should not deny that various tensed claims are true or false with respect to such a perspective. e temporal parts of a perduring object have their own unique spatiotemporal perspectives with respect to which di erent tensed claims will be true and false. Balashov admits that there is therefore a sense in which perduring objects have many di erent spatiotemporal perspectives on reality, but he downplays it as a merely vicarious sense (Balashov , -) .
that enduring objects are multiply located in spacetime whereas perduring objects are singly located. is, in turn, is held to mean that enduring objects (and only enduring objects) "change their position in spacetime" ( a, ). us, it is claimed, for an enduring object as located at any one of its many locations, the world is divided, not just into those things with which it coexists (in the non-trivial sense) and those with which it does not, but also into those things with which it still exists, or with which it no longer exists, and so on ( a, -; c, S -). Occupying more than one location in spacetime is certainly a necessary condition of changing one's location in it. But it is not su cient. We basically agree with Gilmore when he responds that change of position in a space M is change of position in M with respect to some temporal dimension T separate from M ( , ; forthcoming, § ). Balashov, however, is not suggesting, as Weyl apparently once did, that endurantists should think of persisting objects as "crawling upward along" their worldlines (Weyl , ) . All Balashov means is that enduring objects have many distinct spacetime locations with respect to the proper time along their trajectories (Balashov , ) . For the eternalist detenser, this is a perfectly respectable tenseless fact. And since one should be happy to recognize, in general, that an enduring object's instantiating incompatible properties at di erent moments of proper time along its trajectory constitutes change, why can it not similarly be said that an enduring object changes its spacetime location with respect to its proper time?
Part of our problem with this idea is the uncritical employment of the notion of proper time as applied to a persisting object. us far we have tacitly accepted Balashov's idealization of persisting objects as spatially unextended. Balashov views this idealization as harmless ( , ; , ), at least as regards the current argument, but in this respect it is not. How might a notion of proper time for a spatially extended worldtube be de ned? e obvious thought is that we should consider the worldline of the center of mass of the object, and regard proper time along this curve as giving the 'proper time of the object' . Unfortunately the center of mass of an object is not a relativistically well-de ned notion. Perhaps, however, Balashov does not need the proper time of the object to be well de ned. It might be enough to consider the proper time along any timelike worldline lying within the Balashov equates an 'object's proper time' with "the age of the object in its rest frame" (Balashov , ) . But the (instantaneous) rest frame of a spatially extended object is equally not well de ned. e problem is very simply illustrated. Consider an object that has just two pointlike parts of equal mass. Suppose that, with respect to some frame of reference F, they 'oscillate' , moving uniformly towards each other for a period of time before moving uniformly away from each other at the same speed for an equal period of time. e situation described involves the composite object's being at rest in F. But consider a frame comoving with one of the particles during its motion towards the other particle. e object will also be, periodically, at rest in this frame for periods that begin with the other particle's change of direction and end with the comoving particle's change of direction. So the object is at rest in both of two frames in relative motion. worldtube of the object; one might then say that the enduring object changes its spacetime locations with respect to any such temporal parameter.
is suggestion founders on a more substantial problem. As we will see in Section , the relativistic endurantist should not suppose that the locations of a spatially extended persisting object foliate the object's worldtube (or are otherwise parameterizable by a single real number). e most plausible version of relativistic endurantism has persisting objects located at continuously many overlapping spacelike regions of spacetime. is means that, associated with each point along some timelike curve within an object's worldtube, there is an in nity of regions that the object occupies, not one. We conclude that, for realistic persisting objects, no sense can be made of such an object's 'proper time' , and a fortiori no sense can be made of its changing its location with respect to proper time.
It is also important to recognize how insubstantial a notion of change of spacetime location Balashov's notion of an object's proper time would provide, even if it did make sense. Talk of the object's proper time, or of the object occupying a certain region when it is a certain age, might lead one think of these notions as involving something over and above the spatiotemporal distances between the object's locations, as if the object could occupy the very same set of spacetime locations, but at di erent moments of its proper time.
is would, of course, be a mistake. To the extent that one can make sense of an enduring object's proper time, this can be nothing other than the timelike distance along the spacetime curve composed of its locations.
Let us recap. Balashov believes that the enduring object's multiple location means that there is a sense in which the object changes its spacetime location and thus that one can legitimately talk about other objects still or no longer coexisting with that object. We have seen that, to the extent that sense can be made of it, the idea that the enduring object changes its spacetime location comes to nothing over and above the object's being multiply located in timelike separated regions. But perhaps the distinction between being multiply and singly located by itself gives us that the 'temporally loaded' determinations still and no longer etc. are appropriate for enduring objects alone.
A er all, these temporal modi ers suggest the contrast (or comparison) of one spatiotemporal perspective with a previous one. What does it mean to say that, for persisting object O, as located at p, some other object O ′ still exists? Surely this involves the combination of two ideas: (a) O ′ exists (in a non-trivial sense) for O, as at p, and (b) O ′ also exists for O, as at some other location p ′ , where p ′ is in the absolute past of p. Similarly, it would not be correct to say that O ′ no longer exists for O as at p, if it were not the case that (c) O ′ does not exist for O, as at p, and (d) O ′ does exist for O, as located at some p ′ in the absolute past of p. It seems that Balashov is right to suggest that such locutions are intimately tied to the object's being multiply located.
It follows that, in this rather minimal way, there really is an asymmetry between perduring and enduring objects in this regard. Whilst it can be correct to say of some perduring object O, partially located at p, that some other object O ′ no longer exists, this is to be analyzed as: (e) O ′ does not exist for the part of O located at p and (f) O ′ does exist for a part of O located in the absolute past of p. Such 'temporally loaded' locutions thus are applicable to perduring objects, but they do not mean exactly what they mean when applied to enduring objects. As Balashov stresses, whilst objects may literally still or no longer exist for enduring objects, for perduring objects they may do so only in a vicarious sense (Balashov , ) .
. e Absurdity esis
We have therefore conceded to Balashov a slight asymmetry between enduring and perduring objects. But so understood it is not an asymmetry than can underwrite the Absurdity esis. To see why, we turn to the scenarios that Balashov believes to spell trouble for the endurantist. Suppose that one followed Balashov and took non-trivial coexistence to be grounded in spacelike separation. In that case two objects O and O as at p and p could both coexist with O as at p (p and p are spacelike separated as are p and p ), even though O and O do not coexist with each other (p and p are not spacelike separated) (Balashov a, ; c, S ) . Spacelike separation is a non-transitive relation and so, if it is what grounds non-trivial coexistence, this will be non-transitive too. But why should this trouble the endurantist?
Balashov's answer is that this is because the endurantist requires a 'temporally loaded' sense of coexistence according to which objects are sorted into those no longer existent, those still or already existent, and those not yet existent ( a, ; , -). She "must be committed to this distinction in virtue of the basic principle of her ontology" ( a, ). We simply deny this: while the endurantist is entitled to a certain literal understanding of such 'temporally loaded' claims, there is no reason why she must employ them. But in any case, adding to the description of the allegedly problematic scenario the relevant 'temporally loaded' determinations will not make it appear any more absurd. at is, nothing is added by noting that enduring object O, as at some spacetime location, can still exist with one object and already exist with another, when these latter two objects do not coexist with each other. is addition merely introduces a comparison of how things are at that particular location of O with how things are at past or future locations of O. But if the scenario as originally described is not obviously problematic, how could bringing in these comparisons make it so?
In fact, in his reply to Gilmore, Balashov concedes that, if the endurantist goes so far as to accept CASS-that spacelike separation grounds non-trivial coexistencethen he will not accept that the scenario just described involves an absurdity. e lack of transitivity involved is just what is to be expected (Balashov , ) . Balashov thinks that the way the endurantist defender of CASS can avoid absurdity is by denying that O, as at p, coexists with both O (as at p ) and O (as at p ), for ex hypothesi p and p are not spacelike separated. For what it is worth, we see no reason why the CASS endurantist should not admit that O coexists in this way with both O and O , whilst simply denying that such coexistence is rendered absurd by O (as at p ) and O (as at p ) not coexisting with each other. Be that as it may, of more importance is Balashov's next move, for he thinks the endurantist will want to talk about the coexistence of more than two objects at once: CASS, he thinks, requires generalization.
.

Objections from CASH
e generalization that Balashov suggests is CASH (Coexistence As Sharing a Hyperplane of simultaneity): a collection of n objects coexist, as at their n respective locations, i these locations all lie on a at spacelike hypersurface ( , ). Balashov thinks: (I) this notion is preferable to a more liberal alternative (coexistence as sharing of an arbitrary spacelike hypersurface), (II) that CASH involves a kind of 'contextuality' (the details of which we will not discuss) that is problematic for the endurantist (but not the perdurantist) and (III) that CASH involves a kind of 'chronological incoherence' (which is again problematic for the endurantist but not the perdurantist). We disagree with all three theses.
With regard to (I), rst note that CASH, rather than the more liberal notion, is simply not available in the context of general relativity, or even in a generic curved spacetime (like our own!), where there are (typically) no at spacelike hypersurfaces. Second, as will be discussed in Section , the endurantist should not restrict the locations of persisting objects to at spacelike regions of spacetime even when these are available. It follows that even when there are at spacelike hypersurfaces, most locations of enduring objects do not fall within them. What do we say about the coexistence of enduring objects as located at these non-at spacelike regions? ird, Balashov's reasons for rejecting coexistence as the sharing of arbitrary spacelike hypersurfaces are misguided. He writes:
[S]uppose three objects coexisting in a certain spatially at temporallike world form an Euclidean triangle there (i.e., a triangle whose angles sum up to two right angles). Adding other objects to the coexistence pool could make things go 'wild' , even among the members of e endurantist must thus recognize existence in a temporal (or temporal-like) world and sharing such a world as basic facts. (Balashov , -) We have quoted at length because we think this passage reveals the fundamental misconception that lies behind Balashov's unsuccessful coexistence-based arguments against relativistic endurantism. It suggests that Balashov, for reasons that we cannot fathom, conceives of the endurantist as committed to a more substantially 'temporally loaded' view of the world than anything we conceded in our earlier discussion of the Asymmetry esis. It is for this reason that we simply deny what Balashov claims in theses (II) and (III), that 'contextuality' and 'chronological incoherence' are any more problematic for the endurantist than the perdurantist. Both the perdurantist and the endurantist can see them as nothing more than relativistically novel aspects of the way in which di erent spatiotemporal perspectives within a single spacetime interrelate.
As we understand the position, the relativistic endurantist should take the tenseless facts about which spacetime regions enduring objects exactly occupy as basic. It will follow from this pattern of multi-location in spacetime that various global three-dimensional hypersurfaces in spacetime will have as subregions some of the locations of some of the enduring objects in spacetime. Perhaps the right way to analyze tensed utterances made within a relativistic world is in terms of such threedimensional hypersurfaces (though, as we discuss in Section . , we doubt that this is the case). But for enduring objects, just as much for perduring objects, such talk merely encodes certain location-dependent perspectives. e endurantist should not take such hypersurfaces, and co-location on such hypersurfaces, as basic. Quite the opposite is in fact true.
So, to turn to Balashov's example of three objects forming a Euclidean triangle, the endurantist will see the scenario as involving the following basic facts. ere are many at hypersurfaces wholly containing the three objects. Obviously, with Figure respect to these surfaces, the triangle the three objects form is Euclidean. But equally there are countless other surfaces containing these three objects, and with respect to these surfaces the triangle they form will not (generally) be Euclidean. is will be so whether or not the universe of the three objects contains an additional object. But in the example we suppose that there is an additional object. Moreover this additional object is such that (i) no location of it is a subregion of an everywhere spacelike surface with respect to which our rst three objects form a Euclidean triangle, but (ii) some location of it is a subregion of an everywhere spacelike surface also including our rst three objects but with respect to which the triangle they form is not Euclidean. at, at a fundamental level, is all the endurantist is committed to. Nothing goes "wild", is "unstable" or changes from being Euclidean to being non-Euclidean "for no physical reason. "
A nal comment on Balashov's claim that CASH involves chronological incoherence is in order. Balashov's argument begins with the claim that certain sequences of spacelike hyperplanes containing more than one object are "chronologically incoherent": as the sequence progresses one moves in a future direction along some object's worldtube, but in a past direction along another's. ( us consider a sequence that runs from SH to SH in Fig. (a) , where A, B and C are the worldtubes of three objects.) However, Balashov admits this to be no serious probBalashov employs an extremely similar argument against stage theoretic views of persistence (Balashov ) . Our criticisms of the argument against endurantism apply mutatis mutandis to that against stage theory. lem provided there is a sequence that is not chronologically incoherent. He adduces the sequence of hyperplanes parallel to SH and SH as just such a sequence.
Balashov next contends, however, that "there are cases where a chronologically coherent series of temporal-like worlds is not available (unless one makes such a series improperly short)" ( , ); and moreover that such cases are problematic for the endurantist but not perdurantist. His example of just such a case is Fig. (b) .
We set aside the claimed disanalogy between endurance and perdurance, for Balashov's central contention-that no chronologically coherent sequence of hyperplanes is available-seems to us to be plainly false. Every foliation of spacetime by spacelike hyperplanes constitutes a chronologically coherent sequence, and since they run from the most distant past to the farthest future, they can hardly be deemed "improperly short. " As such a sequence progresses, one moves in a future direction along the worldtube of every object (that has a worldtube that intersects the hyperplanes in question).
Problems with 'Wholly Present'
We now turn to a very di erent style of objection to the combination of endurance and relativity. Even in the non-relativistic context, many suspect that no sense can be given to the endurantist's central explanatory notion of wholly present, or at least no sense that di erentiates endurance from perdurance (See Sider , -). We think the shi to ideas of exact location and of multiple location avoids some of the problems. Steven Hales and Timothy Johnson, however, think that there is a speci cally relativistic problem with an object's being wholly present in more than one spacetime location. In particular, they argue that in a relativistic spacetime, "no object wholly exists at each moment of its existence" (Hales & Johnson , , our emphasis). We shall see that their argument can be quickly dealt with.
We nd it hard to understand why Balashov either overlooks the existence of such sequences, or sees them as somehow inadmissable. Consider, again, Fig. (b) . ere are in nitely many spacelike hyperplanes containing all four objects, D, E, F and G, including, let us suppose, ones where D is ve years old and ones where D is forty-ve years old. It is true that, because F's worldtube terminates close to where E's worldtube begins, a chronologically coherent sequence every hyperplane of which contains all four objects will be relatively short-lived (no such sequence can contain both the ve-year old D and the forty-ve year old D). However, these shorter sequences are always segments of longer, chronologically coherent sequences. According to such a longer sequence, three of the objects coexist for a time, then the fourth comes into existence and all four coexist brie y, and then one of the original three ceases to exist. We do not understand why Balashov appears to view such long-lived sequences as illegitimate. Granted, no such sequence contains, e.g., D coexisting with all three other objects both when aged ve and when aged forty-ve. But why think that such sequences are in any way inadequate for this reason? e fact that there are chronologically incoherent sequences according to which D coexists with all four others both at age ve and at age forty-ve seems to us to be simply irrelevant.
We quote their own summary of the argument in full, for it illustrates our theme that relativity is not taken seriously enough even by those whose arguments appeal to it. ey write:
. Endurantism is de ned in this way: o is an enduring object i o wholly exists at each moment of its existence. at is, at every time t at which o exists, every proper part of o is at t
(de nition)
. If SR is correct, then in the rest frame of an object o, each proper part of o is at a speci c time t, and that time is the same for all parts. But for an inertial reference frame moving with respect to an object o, each proper part of o at a di erent position along the direction of relative motion is at a di erent time. at is, in a frame moving relative to o, o has proper parts at t, before t and a er t (premise) . SR is correct (premise) .
us if there is a reference frame moving with respect to an object o, then in that frame o has proper parts at t, before t and a er t .
e universe is not static, and so for any object there are inertial frames other than the rest frame (premise) .
us every object has proper parts at di erent times (from , ) . Hence no object wholly exists at each moment of its existence, and endurantism as de ned in ( ) is false.
(from , ) (Hales & Johnson , ) We have already discussed at length why relativistic endurantists will not accept anything like Hales and Johnson's de nition of endurantism. Rather than talk of times, they will talk of objects wholly existing in, or being exactly located at certain spacetime regions. Note also that Hales and Johnson's explanatory gloss on the de nition, in the second sentence of ( ), appears to commit the endurantist to mereological constancy: that each proper part of an object must be located in a subregion of every region occupied by the object. One might think that such a restriction on endurantism is quite unmotivated.
Hales and Johnson's rst premise ( ) needlessly appeals to frame-relative concepts and, more seriously, appeals to the notion of the rest frame of the object, which we saw in the previous section is, in general, meaningless. ey appear to argue, from how things will be described in two comoving inertial frames, that if an enduring object is wholly located in one set of parallel at spacetime regions, then it must also be located in another set of parallel at spacetime regions that intersect the regions in the rst set. We shall see in the next section that the endurantist should accept this conclusion, but they should not accept this argument for it.
We do not quarrel with ( ), except to note that, because it is not a quantum theory, even general relativity could not be considered as 'correct' without qualication.
( ) and ( ) suggest to us that Hales and Johnson have not fully grasped the notion of a frame of reference. Even if the universe were static, there would still exist an in nity of inertial frames with respect to each of which the universe's static con guration could be (di erently) described.
We take ( ) to be obviously compatible with endurance. In fact, since endurantism just is the thesis that the object (and hence its proper parts) wholly exists at many di erent times (or, better, spacetime regions), to deny ( ) would be to deny endurantism! It follows that ( ), as allegedly derived from ( ) and ( ), is simply a non sequitur.
To be fair to Hales and Johnson, part of the problem is with their own summary of the argument. e idea behind the passage from ( ) to ( ) is the following. Suppose that part of an enduring object O becomes damaged at some point in O's career. Consider a spacetime location R of O that, intuitively, lies immediately prior to the damage event. is event, and thus a location of the damaged part of O, will be timelike related to some parts of R. But it will also be spacelike related to other parts of R. Hales and Johnson's thought is that there is a proper part of O, viz. its damaged part, that is not located within R, even though this part, because it is spacelike separated from some parts of O as located at R, is judged to be simultaneous with those parts, as located at R, in some frame of reference. If O has a proper part not located at R, how can O be wholly present there? e problem with this line of reasoning is obvious to see. For all Hales and Johnson have said, the damaged part of O, located in the immediate future of R, is also located somewhere in R. Relative to R it is undamaged. Relative to the location in the immediate of future of part of R, it is damaged. But since O is an enduring object, its parts also endure. ey too are multiply located in spacetime.
For discussion of why not, see Gilmore (forthcoming, § . ) . We have included this last observation for the sake of completeness, since it is an aspect of their example that Hales and Johnson make much of. We, however, fail to see what it adds. Not unlike Balashov, they take spacelike separation to be at least a su cient condition for a (presumably) nontrivial notion of coexistence.
ey reason that if the damaged part of O coexists (in this sense) with some parts of O located at R, but is not itself located at R, then O is not wholly present at R. But if the non-existence at R of a proper part of O is problematic for the endurantist's notion of wholly present, we see this as problematic whether or not this part coexists in a non-trivial sense with other parts of O at R, for it certainly coexists with them in the eternalist's sense. For further critical discussion of the role of coexistence in Hales and Johnson's argument, see Miller ( , -) . is observation saves endurantism from Hales and Johnson's criticism, however, only to suggest another problem. What of objects that gain and lose parts? How can they be wholly located in each region of spacetime in which they exist? We do not have much to say here, other than that this is a well known (alleged) problem for (eternalist) endurantism, as potent in the non-relativistic context as the relativistic. To some extent, switch to talk of 'exact location' mitigates the appearance of a problem, but if one thought that the exact location of an object O in a region R involved a combination of (i) no region of R not being occupied by a part of O and (ii) no part of O lying outside R, then the problem remains. e situation currently being considered certainly violates the second of these conditions.
We shall see at the end of the next section that the perspective that we ultimately recommend to the endurantist simply side-steps some of these problems. Before we get there, however, we have another set of objections to relativistic endurantism to consider. Our discussion of Hales and Johnson's argument revealed that there is no problem in principle with the idea that an enduring object may be exactly located in two intersecting spacetime regions the points of each of which are simultaneous with respect to di erent frames of reference. But should the endurantist conceive of enduring objects as located in such regions? In fact, it is time to return to a more general question, rst raised in Section . . If enduring objects are exactly located in multiple spacelike regions of spacetime, in which such regions, precisely, are they typically located?
Gilmore and the Every C-Slice Principle
Gilmore's approach to this question is to rst de ne the "path" of an object:
R is the path of O = df R is a region and is the union of the (region or) regions that O exactly occupies. (Gilmore forthcoming, § ) He then asks precisely where an object is located within its path (Gilmore forthcoming, § ) . e perdurantist answer is that an object exactly occupies its entire path. e endurantist instead regards an object as exactly occupying multiple regions within its path. Very well; but which regions?
Gilmore suggests and then criticizes four di erent answers. e Rest Frame Principle holds that an object exactly occupies regions of its worldtube all the parts If we are right to interpret Hales and Johnson's gloss on their de nition of endurantism, quoted above, as entailing mereological constancy, it would seem that their endurantist opponent will be untroubled by this new argument! See Merricks ( ), which is devoted to this objection against the combination of eternalism and endurance.
of which are simultaneous in the rest frame of that object (forthcoming, § . ).
e Top Down Principle assumes a privileged temporal foliation of spacetime. Objects exactly occupy only those maximal regions of their worldtubes that are also subregions of the leaves of this foliation (forthcoming, § . ). e Bottom Up Principle, very roughly, imagines tiny timers attached to the pointlike parts of an object.
ese measure the proper time along the trajectories of the parts in question. Initially (and in a rather idealized way) the timers are set to zero.
e object then exactly occupies regions of the worldtube where the timers on the pointlike parts all read the same (forthcoming, § . ).
We will not repeat Gilmore's decisive objections to these three principles. Instead we focus on a fourth option, the Every Slice Principle (Gilmore forthcoming, § . ) .
is holds that an object exactly occupies each and every achronal slice through its worldtube. How is "slice" to be interpreted? Flat hyperplanes have no special metaphysical signi cance and in any case are not available in a curved spacetime such as our own. Gilmore therefore means by "achronal slice" any hypersurface that is everywhere spacelike. In general the (spatial) geometry of such a surface will be curved. One further quali cation is also required: such regions must be maximal, where a region is a maximal achronal slice through an object's worldtube i it is not a subregion of any other achronal regions within the object's worldtube. (In fact Gilmore only adds this quali cation in response to an objection we consider below (p. ; Gilmore forthcoming, § . ) .) In what follows we refer to the Every Slice Principle (thus interpreted) by the acronym ESP. e idea, to repeat, is that enduring objects exactly occupy every maximal achronal region within their worldtube.
Gilmore raises three apparent problems for ESP. We will nd it easiest to discuss them in reverse order. We begin, then, with his observation that, for the identi cation an object exactly occupying one region with an object exactly occupying another, "an appropriate sort of causal relation (o en called 'immanent causation')" must hold between these 'objects' (forthcoming, § . ). is very general principle he calls MURIC (MUlti-location Requires Immanent Causation). We are minded to accept it.
Gilmore believes that ESP is incompatible with MURIC. In particular, the very same object can, according to ESP, exactly occupy both of the overlapping regions R a and R b in Fig. . But according to Gilmore MURIC does not permit this, since
We use "worldtube" as a synonym for Gilmore's "path". Recall from fn that a region R is achronal i every pair of distinct points within it are spacelike related.
Cf. Sattig's de nition of a temporal part of a region (p. above).
In particular, we think that Humeans about causation should nd the principle no less plausible than non-Humeans, at least when applied to familiar composite persisting objects like tables and people.
Figure the object at R a cannot be the (immanent) cause of the object at R b , nor vice versa (forthcoming, § . ). If we are wedded to MURIC, it seems that ESP will have to go.
Let us take a step back. Anyone initially attracted to ESP will surely regard R a and R b as containing objects and, indeed, objects of the same type; the remaining question is whether they contain the very same object. Let the object at R a be O a and that at R b be O b . In line with MURIC, we should indeed decide whether O a and O b are one and the same based, in part, on whether they are causally related in an appropriately intimate way. But we say that they are so related. In particular, every part of O a is either (i) an immanent cause of the state of a particular part of O b (viz. itself), (ii) in a state that is immanently caused by a part of O b , or (iii) must be reckoned a part of O b because it is exactly located in a region where R a and R b overlap. ( e same holds mutatis mutandis for every part of O b .) Granted, the state of O a as a whole is not causally grounded in the state of O b , or indeed vice versa; but the satisfaction of (i) to (iii) surely constitutes excellent grounds to nonetheless identify O a and O b .
We think that this observation saves ESP from Gilmore's MURIC objection, but consideration of the remainder of Gilmore's discussion will be instructive. In response to his alleged di culty with MURIC, Gilmore o ers the defender of ESP an amended version. Gilmore calls this MURIC*:
Necessarily, for any material object O and distinct spacetime regions Figure   R and R , if O exactly occupies both R and R , then there is some region R such that: (i) R and R are achronal slices of R,
(ii) there is a set S of achronal slices of R such that every point in R belongs to at least one member of S, and for any two members, x and y, of S, the contents of x bear the appropriate sort of immanent causal relation to the contents of y, or vice versa.
(forthcoming, § . )
A er noting two points in favor of MURIC*, Gilmore objects to it as follows. Consider an entity composed of several molecules bound together. In the rest frame of that entity, the molecules are all replaced, successively but extremely rapidly, by intrinsic duplicates to which they are causally unrelated. With diagrammatic gaps representing non-causal replacement (but not spatiotemporal gaps) we thus have the situation depicted in Fig. . e objects exactly located at the regions labeled R and R are surely distinct, since they are on opposite sides of a causal discontinuity. But MURIC* apparently lets us down, in that it fails to rule out their identity.
is is because, at least according to Gilmore, there is a set S satisfying requirement (ii) of MURIC*: (e.g.) the set of parallel slices running from Rest i to Rest f (forthcoming, § . ).
Since we do not judge MURIC and ESP to be incompatible (for the reasons given above), we feel no pressing need to defend MURIC*. Nonetheless, it is being saddled with another's guilt. Is it true that every two members of the set of rest slices bear the "appropriate sort of immanent causal relation" to each other? Surely (the contents of) Rest i and Rest f are not immanently causally related, since they lie on opposite sides of a causal discontinuity! Gilmore thinks that Rest i and Rest f are so related because he explicitly assumes that "the relevant immanent causal relation is transitive" (forthcoming, § . ); and because (for some appropriately chosen parametrization by the real numbers of the parallel slices running from Rest i to Rest f ) Rest n is very plausibly immanently causally related to Rest n+ for all n (even within the region of causal discontinuity).
It is the transitivity assumption, and not MURIC*, that is to blame here. Indeed this assumption even troubles MURIC itself. On the basis of transitivity Gilmore explicitly conceded that any two rest-frame slices are immanently causally related to each other. Rest i and Rest f are therefore immanent-causally related; and so even according to MURIC, their contents may be identi ed. We take this to be a reductio of the transitivity claim.
Transitivity also causes di culties for the less liberal forms of relativistic endurantism that Gilmore considers a er rejecting ESP (see p. above). Any causal discontinuity not parallel to the permitted object-containing slices of a worldtube gives rise to the very same problem.
Indeed, the combination of transitivity and near-instantaneous 'immaculate replacement' raises the same issues even in the non-relativistic case. Suppose that horizontal lines in Fig. represent planes of absolute simultaneity. Any two successive simultaneity slices through the worldtube in question would be immanently causally related. By transitivity then, Rest i and Rest f are again immanently casually related, and no MURIC-like principle will prevent us from identifying them.
MURIC and MURIC* only place necessary conditions on when the occupiers of two regions may be regarded as one and the same, so should not putative counterexamples involve cases where we want to say two such occupiers are the same despite MURIC(*) vetoing this? e case under discussion involves exactly the reverse. Gilmore is right to see it as problematic, however, for the lack of appropriate casual connection between them is the only thing preventing our regarding the occupiers of R and R as the same, and hence it is down to MURIC(*) to rule out their identity.
N.B. that in what follows we occasionally omit this quali cation. Within this region, only a single particle is ever non-causally replaced from one rest slice to the next. Since, as Gilmore points out, we do allow that objects can persist through the gain and loss of parts, such slices "are as intimately causally related as any two slices through a spatially extended, persisting thing ever are" (forthcoming, § . ). e most obvious moral here is that the relevant immanent causal relation is not transitive. Recognizing this is the only way to uphold what should be an uncontroversial truth: that objects that are causally isolated from each other are not immanently causally related. Admittedly, the endurantist has a problem if they think that immanent causal relations are su cient for identity. If this were the case then the fact that immanent causal relations hold between any two successive rest slices would make each such slice identical to the next. By the transitivity of identity, we could then conclude that all such rest slices-including Rest i and Rest f -are identical.
e endurantist must therefore deny that being immanently causally related is su cient for identity. Somewhere along the chain of (pairwise) immanently causally related slices, identity is lost: there are (at least) two such successive slices that do not contain the very same object. is will be because, to put it in rough terms, 'too much' of the object has by this stage been replaced 'too quickly' . True: in a di erent context these two slices might contain the very same object. But that is just to say that identity can fail to hold as a result of accumulated changes. We do not nd this entirely implausible, but the more relevant point is that, however the endurantist deals with non-instantaneous causal discontinuities, they are not a speci cally relativistic problem.
Gilmore's second criticism of ESP concerns time-traveling impenetrable extended simples (forthcoming, § . ). Consider again the worldtube of Fig. , interpreted now as that of an impenetrable extended simple. According to ESP, the object in question is located in very many subregions of that worldtube that overlap each other. R a and R b are examples (overlapping only at a two-dimensional region). But in that case these objects do interpenetrate a er all! Gilmore's immediate riposte in defence of ESP is that R a and R b contain the same object. Allowing such self -penetration is consistent with denying that any two distinct objects can interpenetrate. is response need not have a hint of 'magic physics' about it (how does the object 'know' that it is only with itself that it is allowed to interpenetrate?) because, for extended objects that are not simples at least, 'self-penetration' is really overlap, not interpenetration. ESP in no way suggests that any region of the worldtube of an object is occupied by matter twice over. e occuIf it is analytic that immanent causal relations hold only between states of the same object then we rephrase in terms of quasi-immanent causal relations: relations that are intrinsically identical to bona de immanent causal relations except that they need not be accompanied by identity. e example in the main text illustrates how this might arise.
It would be wrong for the defender of ESP to respond to this by simply refusing to be worried by any problem that arises only in such a recherché scenario. We have clear intuitions about time travel and interpenetration, both of which are respectable from the perspective of relativistic physics. While we may not have such good intuitions about extended simples, some speculative physics (viz. string theory) takes them seriously.
pants of R a and R b (for example) share a part, and so do not interpenetrate, in just the way that the central third of a desk shares a part with (but does not penetrate) the le -hand half of the desk. Gilmore's objects are simples though; they have no parts to share. But must the defender of ESP therefore allow that self-penetration occurs? Are regions of the worldtube of an extended simple persisting as per ESP multiply occupied by matter? If not, can we not still maintain that here we have overlap and not interpenetration?
No matter how one deals with the initial set-up, it is the next cycle of Gilmore's objection that he takes to spell trouble for ESP. Suppose that our simple's path extends around a closed time-like loop so that, in some region of spacetime, the object is on a collision course with its earlier self. e intuitive expectation is that the simple would not self-penetrate. But how can we uphold this given the earlier concession that our simple can self-penetrate?
We do not see why an answer is supposed to be di cult to give. If a world contains extended simples that do not interpenetrate, then (assuming the world is law-governed) it will, for example, be the existence of certain powerful short-range forces that ground non-penetration. e law will ensure that if two occupied disjoint subregions of some global spacelike surface S through spacetime are within some minimum distance from one another, then the pairs of subregions of spacelike hypersurfaces to the immediate future of S that are occupied by the same simples will be more distant from one another. e law will be oblivious to whether it is the same object occupying such pairs of regions or not, and it is entirely consistent with the kind of overlap required by ESP, which only ever involves occupation by the same object of two regions that do not both lie on some spacelike hypersurface. On the other hand, if the world is not law-governed, then the pattern of multi-location exempli ed by our simples will be just a matter of brute fact. But then there is no reason why this brute fact should not be both consistent with ESP and involve no worldlines that intersect themselves.
We therefore reject Gilmore's second objection to ESP. But we o er a helping hand. Suppose that our time-traveling object can penetrate other objects of its type (including itself). Fig. depicts the situation we have in mind; the diagonal worldtube is the time-traveled continuation of the vertical one.
In this case ESP is in a pickle. Consider EF and GH. Intuitively, the timetraveling object does not exactly occupy the fusion of EF and GH, but ESP threatens to yield the opposite result since this fusion is a maximal achronal slice through the object's worldtube. Our intuition is even rmer that the object does exactly anks to John Hawthorne here. In this re-worked example our object, though still extended, need not be a simple.
e mere fact that EF and GH are not contiguous should not by itself be held to rule out their exactly containing a single object, for many (perhaps most) objects do exactly occupy such regions (suits and football teams etc., but perhaps also many less 'dispersed' objects for, e.g., inter-molecular e alert reader will object that the fusion of EF and GH is not in fact achronal; the existence of timelike loops means that EF is in the absolute future of GH (and vice versa) . is fact secures the intuitively desirable result in this case: our timetraveling object exactly occupies both EF and GH (assuming that each region by itself intersects no timelike curve more than once) but not their fusion. Gilmore, however, cannot o er this response, for he de nes ESP in terms of a "local" sense of achronal according to which EF and GH are achronal. (For details, the reader is referred to Gilmore forthcoming, § , fn ; § . , fn .) But nor should he, for abandoning the local sense of achronal for the global only courts other di culties. For example, an object might not time travel itself, but might nonetheless exactly occupy a region containing points that are timelike-separated due to an 'almost closed' timelike curve (Gilmore forthcoming, § , fn ). ESP formulated in terms of the global sense of achronal prohibits this. e moral is that ESP is in di culty. Rather than o er yet another principled answer to Gilmore's location question, however, we instead advocate a point of view according to which the question itself is undercut. Since this viewpoint helps to answer Gilmore's nal objection to ESP (i.e. his rst objection), we give a brief account of this. distances can be much greater than molecular widths).
In fact, Gilmore notes (but does not solve) what is e ectively a non-relativistic version of this problem (forthcoming, § , fn ). ESP without the maximality requirement would rule that the object whose worldtube is depicted does exactly occupy PQ. But this answer becomes impossible to credit when we consider similar regions that are closer still to the top le -hand corner of the worldtube. In the most extreme case, such a region might contain only a single particle. Surely the object does not exactly occupy this region.
Gilmore's solution is to note that PQ, rather like ST, is not a maximal achronal region within the worldtube; it is a subregion of many larger achronal regions, PQR for example.
We are not at all sure this that is the wrong response, but one might worry that it goes too far. Consider the region UV in Fig. b . Supposing the worldtube to be that of a human, this region might contain all the usual parts of a person except for a right hand. Should one say that such a slice does not contain the person in question? If instead we consider someone who loses a hand, ESP (subsequently) locates that person at just such a slice.
Our discussion of the time travel and corner slice objections to ESP has revealed that it does have problems. e root of these problems, however, does not lie with the details of ESP. We see no reason to suppose that any attempt to provide an answer to Gilmore's Location Question will be successful if that answer is meant to be applicable to all types of object, especially if the answer further restricts itself to
Miller raises the same di culty ( ,
characterizing the objects' locations in purely spatiotemporal terms (as ESP does).
On the approach we prefer, the endurantist proceeds on a case-by-case, regionby-region basis, so that whether an object exactly occupies a region depends critically on the type of object being considered. e endurantist believes that objects are three-dimensional and exactly occupy multiple spacetime regions. But the precise locations of such an object are not determined by the fact that some spacetime region contains its worldtube and that certain subregions of this region satisfy certain geometric constraints. It is, of course, the other way around. Facts about where the object is located determine which region is its worldtube. is might be as true for point particles as for composite objects; some facts about where a particle is located, together with causal laws, will determine that the particle is also located in certain other point-sized regions.
For composite objects, bedrock is the pattern of (multiple) location of the fundamental entities that, at various spacetime regions, compose them. Some threedimensional achronal regions will contain the right sorts of such entities, arranged in the appropriate way, for these entities to compose a particular type of object at that region. We thus arrive at three-dimensional objects. In general, whether a given three-dimensional region contains an object of a given type will not just be a matter of the intrinsic character of the contents of that region. It will also depend on regions to its past and future having the right kind of content. And it will also depend on regions that are spacelike related to it having the right kind of content (statue shaped regions within blocks of marble are not statues).
is gives us variously located three-dimensional objects. But some of these 'objects' are the very same object. Such identity facts will be determined by a mixture of spatiotemporal and causal considerations; but, just as with composition, the precise details may be expected to vary from kind to kind and from object to object. In any case, it is only at this late stage that the identi cations that determine an enduring object's worldtube enter the picture. We only arrive at the path of an object of a certain type by rst determining which three-dimensional regions contain objects of that type and then by determining which regions contain the same object. We then take the union of a set of such regions. But if the path is arrived at in this way, which locations within it are occupied by its object cannot be an interesting question that remains outstanding. We already know the answer.
Cf. Sider ( , -). It is this type of consideration that gives the maximality requirement in ESP whatever plausibility it has, particularly in regard to the region ST in Fig. a. 
